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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
LORENZO MIRANDA-RAMIREZ,

Case No. 920454-CA
Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. section 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1992), and Utah R. Crim.
P. 26(2)(a), whereby a defendant in a district court criminal action
may take an appeal to the Court of Appeals from a final judgment and
conviction for any crime other than a first degree or capital felony.

STATUTE8 AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The pertinent parts of the following statutes and
constitutional provisions are contained in the text of this brief or
in Addendum A:
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii)

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Whether the State's evidence sufficiently supported a
probable cause bindover determination.

•• [T]he district court need

show no deference to the magistrate's legal conclusion, . . . but may
conduct its own review of the order."

State v. Humphrey. 818 P.2d

1027 (Utah 1991); State v, Cooper. 809 P.2d 515, 517 (Idaho App.
1991) ("our standard of review of a district court decision where the
district court is sitting in an appellate capacity is one of free
review"); accord Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney, 818 P.2d 23, 26
(Utah App, 1991).
STATEMENT OF THE CA8E AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction for
attempted unlawful distribution, offering, agreeing, consenting or
arranging to distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, a
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. section
58-37-8(1)(a)(ii), and pursuant to a plea bargain agreement.
(R 55-61, 65; 128).
On May 1, 1992, the State filed an Information which was
then amended and refiled on June 12, 1992.

(R 07-08, 21-22).

On

June 17, 1992, Mr. Miranda-Ramirez moved "to Quash the Bindover of
the Circuit Court and to Dismiss the Information[. ]lf
79-105).

The trial court denied his motions.

(R 20;

(R 50-52).

Mr. Miranda-Ramirez then entered a conditional plea of
guilty contingent upon his right to appeal the court's ruling.
(R 55-61; 111; 120-21; 127-28).

Following its acceptance of the

plea, the court sentenced Mr. Miranda-Ramirez to an indeterminate
term of zero-to-five years in the Utah State Prison and also ordered
him to make various payments.

The court immediately suspended

imposition of sentence and placed him on probation for three years.
(R 65).

Due to his status as an illegal alien, Mr. Miranda-Ramirez
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was deported1 by the I.N.S.

Other facts relevant to this section

are stated elsewhere in the brief.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The State initially filed an Information, dated May 8,
1992, which alleged in relevant part that Mr. Miranda Ramirez "did
knowingly and intentionally distribute, offer, agree, consent or
arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, to-wit:
Cocaine, a Schedule II Controlled Substance.
added).

(R 07) (emphasis

On June 12, 1992, the State filed an Amended Information

which alleged that Mr. Miranda Ramirez "did knowingly and
intentionally offer, agree, consent or arrange to distribute a
controlled or counterfeit substance, to-wit: Cocaine, a Schedule II
Controlled Substance.

(R 21). With the exception of the word,

"distribute," the Amended Information was essentially the same as
the initially filed Information.
The amendment resulted from a preliminary hearing
discussion, held on May 21, 1992, in which the State was unable to
produce a toxicologist (report) or establish a chain of custody that
could identify the evidence obtained as cocaine or a counterfeit
substance.

(R 23-49).

The State deleted the "distribute" language

and instead focused on whether Mr. Miranda-Ramirez had "offered" to
distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance.

(R 81-82).

1
Cf. United States v. Campos-Serrano, 404 U.S. 293,
294 n.2 (1971); State v. Ortiz, 774 P.2d 1229 (Wash. 1989)
(deportation does not moot the appeal).
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According to the State, Detective Tony Garcia and another
undercover narcotics officer entered the Shamrock bar on April 23,
1991.

(R 30-31).

The charge was based on detective Garcia's belief

that the substance in a "baggy" was cocaine notwithstanding the
State's failure of produce the substance, itself.
[Witness, Detective Garcia]: On that evening Detective
Lucas and myself walked in the Shamrock bar. We were
approached by several individuals as to ahw, if we wanted
to buy some some [sic] narcotics, cocaine. Ahw, we by
passed those individuals and one sat down at a booth.
While we were sitting at the booth the defendant came up to
me and asked me if I needed anything.
[Prosecutor]: By the defendant you're talking about the
[man] that just sat down?
A:

Yes, I am.

Q: Alright. And when he came up and sat down next to you
what did he say?
A: Ahw, I asked him, he asked me if I needed anything I
told him ahw, ahw, I wanted a l/16th — cocaine.
Q:

How did he respond to that?

A:

Ahw . • •

Pros: . . . And ahw, how did he respond to that when you
say you wanted l/16th ounce of cocaine?
Wit [Garcia]: Ahw, he showed me ahw, small baggy of
cocaine which he produced and held it in front of me.
Q:

Alright.

What did you say?

A:

I asked him how much he wanted for it.

Q:

What did he say?

A:

He said $60 dollars.

Q:

And then what?

- 4

-

A: I handed him a $100 dollar bill he handed me the baggy
of cocaine and $40 dollars change.
Q:

And any further dealings with him that night?

A:

No I did not.

(R 32-33).
The State's contention was that it did not have to produce
the substance, regardless of whether it was real or counterfeit,
because the prosecution's focus was on the "offer" to distribute the
substance.
It is the State's position [now] . . . and at the
preliminary hearing [on this charge] . . . that when the
offer is made and something that the defendant holds out to
be a controlled substance is agreed upon, whether or not a
real narcotic exists, [then] that crime is complete. We
did not bring the controlled substance itself to the
hearing nor the toxicology report. We brought in an
officer [detective Garcia] who stated he dealt with
Mr. [Miranda-]Ramirez. He handed over money and
Mr. [Miranda-]Ramirez handed over something
Mr. [Miranda-]Ramirez [sic] held out to be cocaine.
(R 81-82).

The differences between the prosecutor's recollection

and the actual testimony of detective Garcia will be elaborated upon
below.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The testimony of the State's key witness, Detective Garcia,
did not provide evidence of the existence of a crime.

Even though

Garcia may have subjectively perceived his encounter with
Mr. Miranda-Ramirez as one involving a drug "buy," since no evidence
of cocaine was produced and because Miranda-Ramirez never
represented that he would sell Garcia a controlled substance,
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Mr. Miranda-Ramirez's conduct did not fall under the plain language
of the statute.
ARGUMENT
THE PROBABLE CAUSE BINDOVER DETERMINATION WAS NOT
SUFFICIENTLY SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE
Utah Code Ann. section 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii), reads "it is
unlawful for any person to knowingly and intentionally . . .
distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree,
consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfeit
substance[.]"

Id. (emphasis added).

Following the preliminary

hearing, the word "distribute" was deleted from the Information and
the State instead emphasized that Mr. Miranda-Ramirez had already
completed the crime when he "offered" to distribute a controlled or
counterfeit substance.

(R 51) (Minute entry) ("It is the State's

position that the essence of the crime charged is the offering to
sell a controlled or counterfeit substance"); (R 81).
Since the State failed to provide proof that the involved
substance was in fact cocaine, the alleged crime must be shown
through evidence of a "counterfeit substance."

Cf. (R 115) ("at the

preliminary hearing, the State elected, affirmatively elected not to
bring on the chain, toxicology and the actual drugs because we [the
State] think that we have met probable cause of a crime [offering to
distribute]").

However, as reflected by the involved officer's

testimony, Mr. Ramirez-Miranda never represented that the substance
in the baggy was cocaine or a counterfeit substance. Ramirez-
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Miranda stated only that he wanted $60 dollars for the contents in
the baggy.

Detective Garcia was the person responsible for

expressing his interest in cocaine.

Mr. Miranda-Ramirez's conduct

did not amount to a crime under the plain language of the statute:
Q [the prosecutor]: Alright. And when he [MirandaRamirez] came up and sat down next to you [detective
Garcia] what did he say?
A [Garcia]: Ahw, I asked him, he asked me if I needed
anything I told him ahw, ahw, I wanted a l/16th — cocaine.
Q:

How did he respond to that?

A:

Ahw • . .
. . .

Pros: . . . And ahw, how did he respond to that when you
say you wanted 1/16th ounce of cocaine?
Wit [Garcia]: Ahw, he showed me ahw, small baggy of
cocaine which he produced and held it in front of me.
Q:

Alright.

What did you say?

A:

I asked him how much he wanted for it.

Q:

What did he say?

A:

He said $60 dollars.

Q:

And then what?

A: I handed him a $100 dollar bill he handed me the baggy
of cocaine and $40 dollars change.
(R 32-33).
Asking a person if he "needs anything" does not amount to
agreeing, consenting, offering, or arranging to distribute a
controlled or counterfeit substance.

Utah Code Ann.

§ 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii). Nor would the involved statute criminalize a
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"baggy" sale notwithstanding the detective's perceptions, as opposed
to an individual's representations of the contents at issue.

The

statute focuses only on the accused's representations and places no
relevance on the detective's preconceived notions or his perceptions
of ambiguous conduct.

See Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-2(5)(b)

("'Counterfeit substance' means . . . any substance that is
represented to be a controlled substance").
Nothing in the record reflects whether the substance in the
baggy weighed "l/16th" of an ounce or even if the amount would have
appeared consistent with the detective's request.

Particularly

since detective Garcia had never previously bought or attempted to
buy narcotics (or counterfeit substances) from Mr. Miranda-Ramirez,
(R 42), Garcia lacked the benefit of prior dealings or a course of
performance as a means of interpretion.

The State failed to clarify

whether Miranda-Ramirez's production of a baggie was not simply a
follow up to his willingness to sell "anything" to Garcia, as
opposed to a misplaced perception of a targeted individual suspected
of drug dealing.

The burden of proof and the burden of resolving

ambiguous conduct fell on the State.2

2
Unlike other cases where neither the validity of the
drug nor the representations of the defendant were at issue, see.
e.g., State v. Pelton, 801 P.2d 184 (Utah App. 1990) (citing cases),
here the defendant's conduct or lack or conduct could not be viewed
as an "offer." Detective Garcia was the individual referring to
cocaine.
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CONCLUSION
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse his
conviction.
SUBMITTED this jLQ

day of October, 1992.

ONALD S. FUJI1
RONALD
FUJINO
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

JAMES A. VALDEZ
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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I, RONALD S. FUJINO, hereby certify that I have caused eight
copies of the foregoing to be delivered to the Utah Court of
Appeals, 400 Midtown Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Salt Lake City, Utah
84102, and four copies to the Attorney General's Office, 236 State
Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this P*\
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day of October, 1992.

DELIVERED/MAILED this

day of October, 1992.
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ADDENDUM A

58-37-8. Prohibited acts — Penalties.
HI) Prohibited acts A — Penalties:
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person
to knowingly and intentionally:
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree,
consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfeit
substance;
_

